UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ERNEST CALVINO JR.,

Plaintiff,

-against-

JULIO COULEONE,

Defendant.

20-CV-0379 (CM)
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff brings this action *pro se*. By order dated January 22, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, *in forma pauperis* ("IFP"). For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

A claim is frivolous when it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), *abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); *see also Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (holding that

"finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible"); *Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co.*, 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[A]n action is 'frivolous' when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . ; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings his claims using the Court's general complaint form. He checks off the box to indicate that he invokes the Court's federal question jurisdiction. In the section of the form that asks which of his federal constitutional or federal statutory rights have been violated, Plaintiff writes, "I.D. transfer because my [a]sset, money, [b]usiness, property are in that name." (ECF No. 2, at 2.)

Plaintiff alleges the following, verbatim: "I am a victim of I.D. theft and someone made that name to protect my Asset, money, Businesses propertys. I want to transfer all the above to my name Ernest Calvino in a forma and normal way with certified Document autorizes by the proper entitile." (*Id.*) Plaintiff lists his injuries as "lost of money, lost of time." In the section of the form that asks for the relief Plaintiff is seeking, he writes, "transfer All my Asset, money, propertys, Busnesses." (*Id.* at 6.)

DISCUSSION

Even when read with the "special solicitude" due *pro se* pleadings, *Triestman*, 470 F.3d at 474-75, Plaintiff's claims rise to the level of the irrational, and there is no legal theory on which he can rely. *See Denton*, 504 U.S. at 33; *Livingston*, 141 F.3d at 437.

District courts generally grant a *pro se* plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. *See Hill v. Curcione*, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); *Salahuddin v. Cuomo*, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

Because the defects in Plaintiff's complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend and dismisses the action as frivolous. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

LITIGATION HISTORY

Plaintiff has filed 68 actions in this Court from December 17, 2019, through January 17, 2020. More than thirty of these actions have been dismissed as frivolous, and Plaintiff has been warned that further vexatious or frivolous litigation in this Court will result in an order under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 barring him from filing new actions IFP unless he receives prior permission. *See, e.g., Calvino v. Armany,* ECF 1:20-CV-0387, 3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2020); *Calvino v. Hadid*, ECF 1:20-CV-0138, 4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2020); *Calvino v. Little Wane Father*, ECF 1:20-CV-0134, 4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2020); *Calvino v. Sanchez*, ECF 1:20-CV-0065, 4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2020); *Calvino v. Cirino*, ECF 1:19-CV-11953, 4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2020); *Calvino v All the women that sue me Int'l and Nat'l*, ECF 1:19-CV-11914, 4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2020); *Calvino v. Salad*, ECF 1:19-CV-11827, 4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2020); *Calvino v. Trainor*, ECF 1:19-CV-11668, 4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2020); *Calvino v. Jones*, ECF 1:19-CV-11601, 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2019); *Calvino v. Internal Affe*, ECF 1:19-CV-11611, 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2019); *Calvino v. Anneka C.*, ECF 1:19-CV-11610, 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2019).

By order dated January 10, 2020, the Court directed Plaintiff to show cause in writing why he should not be barred as of January 10, 2020, from filing any further IFP actions in this Court without first obtaining this Court's permission. *See Calvino v. Fauto L.*, ECF 1:19-CV-11958, 4 (Jan. 10, 2020).

CONCLUSION

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket.

Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. *See Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court is directed to docket this as a "written opinion" within the meaning of Section 205(a)(5) of the E-Government Act of 2002.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 22, 2020

New York, New York

COLLEEN McMAHON Chief United States District Judge